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ESSAY 
LONE PINE ORDERS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
NORA FREEMAN ENGSTROM† & AMOS ESPELAND†† 
Invented in 1986 and now a prominent feature of the mass tort landscape, Lone 
Pine orders require plaintiffs to provide to the court prima facie evidence of injury, 
exposure, and specific causation—sometimes early, and usually on pain of dismissal. 
Though they’ve taken root in a hazy space outside of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, these case management orders are frequently issued, and they play an 
important role in the contemporary litigation and resolution of mass torts. But 
although Lone Pine orders are common, potent, and increasingly controversial, they 
have mostly fallen under the academic radar. Even their key features are described 
inconsistently by commentators and courts. This Essay pulls back the curtain. 
Drawing on a unique hand-coded dataset, this Essay describes the origin and 
evolution of Lone Pine orders, sketches poles of the debate surrounding their use, and 
offers empirical evidence regarding their entry, content, timing, and effect. 
INTRODUCTION 
A Lone Pine order is a case management order that typically requires 
plaintiffs to provide prima facie evidence of injury, exposure, and causation, 
generally on pain of dismissal. Originating in the 1986 New Jersey state court 
decision, Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., these case management orders have become 
a familiar—and prominent—feature of the mass tort landscape.1 Lone Pine 
orders have played a role in many of the most significant product liability 
† Professor of Law and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School. 
†† Stanford Law School, J.D. 2020. 
1 Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986). 
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cases of all time, including litigation involving asbestos,2 Vioxx,3 Fosamax,4 
Rezulin,5 Celebrex,6 Nimmer Nexgen knee implants,7 Baycol,8 Avandia,9 and 
Fresenius.10 And the orders are currently much in vogue: a bill that would 
codify, and even mandate, the use of Lone Pine orders in multidistrict litigation 
(MDL) recently passed the House of Representatives.11
Yet, notwithstanding their practical importance and current prominence, 
these case management orders have somehow fallen under the academic radar. 
Aside from a couple of student notes, Lone Pine orders have been the subject 
of remarkably little academic scrutiny.12 And courts vary widely in their 
descriptions—and use—of this potent procedural device. 
2 Amended Administrative Order No. 12, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d 
236, 241 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 01-0875). 
3 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 (E.D. La. 2008), aff ’d, 388 F. App’x 
391 (5th Cir. 2010). 
4 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-1789, 2012 WL 5877418, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012). 
5 Pretrial Order No. 370, In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-2843, 2005 WL 1105067, at 
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2005); Pretrial Order at 1-2, In re N.Y. Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
0752000/2000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter N.Y. Rezulin Pretrial Order].
6 Pretrial Order No. 29 at 1-4, In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. 
Litig., No. 05-1699 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2008). 
7 Pretrial Order No. 11 at 2-4, In re Zimmer Nexgen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-
5468 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2016). 
8 In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 01-1431, 2004 WL 626866, at *1-2 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2004). 
9 Pretrial Order No. 121 at 2-4, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 07-
1871 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2010). 
10 Pretrial Order No. 17 at 5-7, In re Fresenius Granuflo/Nautralyte Dialysate Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 13-2428 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2017). 
11 Among other things, the bill provides that, within forty-five days of transferring a personal 
injury action into an MDL: 
counsel for a plaintiff . . . shall make a submission sufficient to demonstrate that there 
is evidentiary support . . . for the factual contentions in plaintiff ’s complaint regarding 
the alleged injury, the exposure to the risk that allegedly caused the injury, and the 
alleged cause of the injury. 
Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 
985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017). 
12 This is changing, as Nora Freeman Engstrom very recently published a piece on Lone Pine 
orders in the Yale Law Journal and Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has penned a response. See Nora 
Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE. L.J. 2 (2019); see also Elizabeth Chamblee 
Burch, Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict Litigation: A Response to Engstrom, 129 YALE. L.J.F. 64 (2019). 
Prior to those contributions, the most comprehensive treatments were authored by practitioners or 
students. See, e.g., Cal R. Burnton, Narrowing the Field in Mass Torts: The Lone Pine Solution, 19 
PROD. LIAB. LITIG. REP., Apr. 2008, at 15; James P. Muehlberger & Boyd S. Hoekel, An Overview 
of Lone Pine Orders in Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 DEF. COUNSEL J. 366 (2004); William A. Ruskin, 
Prove It or Lose It: Defending Against Mass Tort Claims Using Lone Pine Orders, 26 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 599 (2003); John T. Burnett, Comment, Lone Pine Orders: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing for 
Environmental and Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 53 (1998); Michelle Sliwinski, 
Note, Addressing the Fissures in Causation Claims: A Case Against the Use of Lone Pine Orders as 
Procedural Hurdles in Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 77 
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Here, we begin the process of bridging those gaps. Our analysis proceeds 
in three Parts. Part I offers a primer on Lone Pine orders. It recounts the 
orders’ 1986 invention, traces their early adoption, and describes their 
purpose. Part II then briefly sketches the poles of the debate surrounding the 
orders’ use, focusing on recent criticism of the Lone Pine mechanism. Part III 
then draws on our unique, hand-coded dataset of ninety-seven Lone Pine 
orders, issued by both state and federal trial courts from 1986 to 2019, to offer 
a descriptive account. Our descriptive statistics permit us to offer new, and 
in some cases surprising, information concerning Lone Pine orders’ use, 
content, timing, and effect. 
Three of our conclusions are particularly noteworthy. First, although any 
conclusion regarding “trends” ought to be viewed with particular suspicion, 
we find evidence that, from 1989 until 2014, Lone Pine orders were on the rise. 
But we find some tentative evidence that, within the past few years, their 
popularity may have flagged.13 Second, we find that Lone Pine orders’ timing 
of entry varies considerably: Some Lone Pine orders are issued prior to 
discovery; some are issued once discovery is in full swing; and some are issued 
at the tail-end of litigation, once a global or mass settlement agreement has 
been at least preliminarily forged. Contrary to the views of several judges and 
commentators,14 then, Lone Pine orders are not exclusively “prediscovery” 
procedural devices. Nor are they exclusively orders sought “after the 
settlement is consummated.”15 They are, for better or worse, case 
management orders issued at nearly any time throughout a litigation’s 
lifecycle. Third and finally, we find that Lone Pine orders are potent: 61% of 
(2016); Scott A. Steiner, Note, The Case Management Order: Use and Efficacy in Complex Litigation 
and the Toxic Tort, 6 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 71 (1999). 
13 For why this conclusion ought to be viewed with some suspicion, see infra note 78 and 
accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Lone 
Pine orders . . . are pre-discovery orders designed to handle the complex issues and potential burdens 
on defendants and the court in mass tort litigation by requiring plaintiffs to produce some evidence 
to support a credible claim.” (citation omitted)); In re AET Inc. Ltd., No. 10-0051, 2018 WL 4203351, 
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018) (“Lone Pine orders . . . are pre-discovery orders . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Modern Holdings, LLC v. Corning Inc., No. 13-0405, 2015 
WL 6482374, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2015) (“Lone Pine orders . . . are pre-discovery orders . . . .” 
(citation omitted)); 28 JILL GUSTAFSON & ERIC C. SURETTE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS 
EDITION § 64:56 (2019) (“A Lone Pine order is a prediscovery order . . . .”); 6 STEPHEN LEASE, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 19:25 (3d ed. 2019) (“‘Lone Pine orders’ are 
prediscovery orders . . . .” (footnote omitted)); DANA SHILLING & BARBARA DETKIN, LAWYER’S 
DESK BOOK § 16.01 (2019) (“A ‘Lone Pine’ order is a pre-discovery order . . . .”). 
15 See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2175, 2186 (2017) (defining Lone Pine orders as orders sought “after the settlement is consummated”); 
see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 100 
(2017) (defining Lone Pine orders as filings issued late in litigation “that impose evidentiary 
production requirements on non-settling plaintiffs”). 
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the Lone Pine orders in our dataset (or 74% of the eighty orders for which we 
were able to observe whether the order had an effect) were followed by at 
least partial summary judgment for defendants or the dismissal of at least 
some of plaintiffs’ claims. 
I. LONE PINE ORDERS: INVENTION, DEFINITION, AND PURPOSE
A. The 1986 Invention of a Unique Case Management Device
Lone Pine orders trace their origin to Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., a state court 
case filed in April 1985 in Monmouth County, New Jersey.16 Large and messy, 
the lawsuit arose when a motley crew of property owners sued 464 defendants 
alleging property depreciation and personal injury caused by water pollution 
reportedly emanating from the Lone Pine Landfill—a large waste site that 
had operated for two decades before it was eventually shuttered in 1979.17 
The suit was filed with some fanfare. But soon after its initiation, 
plaintiffs’ case seemingly ground to a halt. After seven months of litigation, 
plaintiffs had served only a “few” of the 464 defendants they had originally 
named in their complaint.18 Then, nine months in, the court became aware 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had prepared a report 
about the landfill that severely undercut plaintiffs’ claims.19 Ominously for 
plaintiffs, the EPA found that the environmental contamination that was the 
target of plaintiffs’ complaint (and was, in plaintiffs’ telling, to blame for their 
various ailments) was, in fact, “confined to the landfill and its immediate 
vicinity.”20 This finding was relevant—and, for plaintiffs, deeply troubling—
because some plaintiffs alleging injury lived some distance away. In fact, one 
plaintiff lived twenty miles from the landfill, and two more of the allegedly 
affected individuals resided two miles from it “in different directions.”21 
Both the sluggish pace of the litigation and the shadow cast by the EPA 
report ultimately prompted Judge William T. Wichmann to take a novel step. 
Following a January 1986 status conference, Judge Wichmann entered an 
unusual case management order, prior to the start of discovery.22 This order 
compelled the Lone Pine plaintiffs to provide, under penalty of dismissal, 
“basic facts . . . in order to support their claims of injury and property 
damage” including “[r]eports of treating physicians and medical or other 




20 Id. at *3. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at *1-2. 
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experts, supporting each individual plaintiff ’s claim of injury and causation 
by substances from Lone Pine Landfill,” all “on or before June 1, 1986.”23 
The plaintiffs offered some information in response to Judge Wichmann’s 
case management order, but it was far from satisfactory. As a defense lawyer 
put it: “With regard to the personal injuries, there is no evidence whatsoever 
of any toxic or chemical contamination of any of the bodies of the plaintiffs.”24 
Judge Wichmann agreed, observing that plaintiffs’ filings were “woefully and 
totally inadequate.”25 “Plaintiffs,” Judge Wichmann complained, “merely 
listed a variety of illnesses such as allergies, itching, dryness of skin, and the 
like. No records were submitted to substantiate any physical problems, their 
duration or severity. No doctors’ reports were provided.”26 The upshot was, 
although plaintiffs’ lawsuit had been pending for over a year, “defendants 
were no better off” than when suit was first filed.27 Accordingly, on November 
18, 1986, an exasperated Judge Wichmann dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims 
with prejudice28—and, crucial for our purposes, the Lone Pine idea was born. 
Within a few years of Judge Wichmann’s ruling, the Lone Pine idea spread 
from Monmouth County, New Jersey to Niagara County, New York. There, 
as in Lone Pine, plaintiffs were alleging injury from their exposure to a noxious 
landfill (this time, the notorious Love Canal) and, also as in Lone Pine, their 
claims aroused judicial suspicion.29 This time, suspicion arose because, among 
other oddities, “some plaintiffs not even born until 1980” alleged they 
“frequented” the contaminated area in 1980, while other plaintiffs alleged they 
were injured when they visited an area that was, in reality, closed and 
protected by an eight-foot-high fence on the dates in question.30 Convinced 
that “a new approach to the handling of these . . . actions” was needed—and 
relying on both Lone Pine and the court’s own inherent authority—on May 
17, 1989, Judge Vincent Doyle issued an order similar to Judge Wichmann’s 
novel submission.31 In particular, Judge Doyle required plaintiffs to come 
forward with clear evidence of exposure and injury and also to file “[r]eports 
or affidavits of a physician or other qualified expert demonstrating that each 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at *4. 
25 Id. at *2. 
26 Id. at *3. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at *4. 
29 In re Love Canal Actions, 547 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (Sup. Ct. 1989), modified, 555 N.Y.S.2d 519 
(App. Div. 1990). 
30 Id. at 178-79. 
31 Id. at 177-79. 
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injury of a plaintiff was, in fact, caused by the plaintiff ’s exposure to chemicals 
at or from the old Love Canal landfill.”32 
Soon thereafter, in 1991, Judge Franklin Battin of the United States District 
Court of Montana picked up the baton, issuing another Lone Pine order in 
another notable suit involving health effects allegedly traceable to the 
defendant’s environmental contamination.33 In Eggar v. Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co., “twenty-seven plaintiffs filed suit against Burlington Northern” 
asserting that they suffered from various maladies stemming from their 
exposure to an assortment of chemicals seeping from Burlington Northern’s 
Livingston shop,34 a two-mile-long complex that contained a railyard alongside 
rail car maintenance and repair facilities.35 Judge Battin expressed skepticism 
regarding any alleged link between Burlington and the plaintiffs’ “multitude of 
ailments” and so, taking cues from Lone Pine and Love Canal, issued a case 
management order on March 6, 199136 demanding that six “test” plaintiffs file 
detailed affidavits from physicians.37 The order further specified: 
The physicians [sic] affidavit shall specify, for each test plaintiff, the precise 
injuries, illnesses or conditions suffered by that plaintiff; the particular 
chemical or chemicals that, in the opinion of the physician, caused each 
injury, illness or condition; and the scientific and medical bases for the 
physician’s opinions. It will not be sufficient for the affidavit to state a 
“laundry list” of injuries and chemicals; each injury, illness or condition must 
be itemized and specifically linked to the chemical or chemicals believed to have 
caused that particular injury, condition or illness. Moreover, the statement of 
scientific and medical bases for the opinion shall include specific reference to 
the particular scientific and/or literature [sic] forming the basis for the opinion.38 
32 Id. at 174. On appeal, the Appellate Division expressed uneasiness with the trial court’s 
ruling and modified the trial court’s discovery order, while cautioning “CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) does not 
provide for the disclosure of expert reports as ordered by the Justice to whom the cases have been 
assigned for trial.” In re Love Canal Actions, 555 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (App. Div. 1990). 
33 Eggar v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., No. 89-0159, 1991 WL 315487, at *4 (D. Mont. Dec. 18, 
1991), aff ’d sub nom. Claar v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994). 
34 Id. 
35 Burlington Northern Livingston Shop Complex CERCLA Facility, MONTANA.GOV, 
http://deq.mt.gov/land/statesuperfund/bnlivingston [https://perma.cc/E2SN-Q8BB] (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2020). 
36 Eggar, 1991 WL 315487, at *4; see also Claar, 29 F.3d at 500 (noting that the trial court issued 
the order “[o]ut of concern that plaintiffs might not be able to demonstrate a causal connection 
between their . . . chemical exposure and their injuries”). The court first issued a Lone Pine order on 
February 26, 1990 but issued a subsequent (and more substantial) order on March 6, 1991, after 
concluding that plaintiffs’ original submissions in response to the February 1990 order were wanting 
as they “contained mere laundry lists of chemicals and injuries.” Eggar, 1991 WL 315487, at *4. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at *5. The March 1991 order did not contain italics. Id. at *4-5. Italics were added in the 
court’s subsequent order, granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. 
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The Eggar plaintiffs responded to the case management order by the 
court-imposed deadline.39 But as in Lone Pine, the court found plaintiffs’ 
submissions wanting. Though the plaintiffs submitted two physicians’ 
affidavits that were “over 150 pages each,” the affidavits, Judge Battin ruled, 
were unsatisfactory.40 They “failed to specifically link each injury, illness, or 
condition to the specific chemical[s] believed to have caused it.”41 And 
neither affidavit “set forth the medical and scientific bases for their opinions 
regarding each plaintiff.”42 Thus, as in Lone Pine, Judge Battin terminated 
the plaintiffs’ claims.43 
B. Contemporary Use
In the decades since these initial forays, federal and state courts around the 
country have taken the Lone Pine idea and run with it. Many courts, in many 
states, have issued Lone Pine orders, leading some to suggest that Lone Pine 
orders have become “common”44—even “routine”45—in mass tort litigation. 
In federal courts, though no specific rule authorizes their entry, the 
orders are generally issued under the auspices of Rule 16 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Rule 16(c)(2)(L), a vague and 
encompassing provision added to the federal rulebook in 1983 which 
empowers courts to “adopt[] special procedures for managing potentially 
difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple 
parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems.”46 State courts’ 
39 Id. at *5. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (alterations in original). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at *11. There were two notable differences, however. First, in Eggar, the court granted 
defendant’s summary judgment motion (rather than a motion to dismiss). Compare id., with Lore v. 
Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986). 
Second, in Eggar, the court granted summary judgment for defendant regarding the six test cases. 
Eggar, 1991 WL 315487, at *11. Thus, in Eggar, the Lone Pine process did not immediately terminate 
the entire litigation. Id. 
44 See, e.g., Arias v. DynCorp, 752 F.3d 1011, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (referring to Lone Pine orders 
as a “common trial management technique”). 
45 In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 687 F. App’x 210, 214 (3d Cir. 
2017) (referring to the orders as “routine”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 
(E.D. La. 2008) (stating that the orders are “routinely used by courts to manage mass tort cases”), 
aff ’d 388 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2010). 
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L); e.g., McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 384, 384 (S.D. Ind. 
2009) (“Lone Pine orders are permitted by Rule 16(c)(2)(L) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
. . . .”); Ramos v. Playtex Prod., Inc., No. 08-2703, 2008 WL 4066250, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2008) 
(“Such orders are permitted by Rule 16(c)(2)(L) . . . .”); cf. McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power 
Generation Grp., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 347, 351 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing, instead, Rule 16(c)(2)(A), 
which authorizes courts to adopt procedures for the purpose of “formulating and simplifying the 
issues, and eliminating frivolous claims or defenses” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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authority to issue Lone Pine orders, meanwhile, is said to come from a range 
of sources, including courts’ “inherent authority.”47 
For the most part, in actually crafting these orders, courts hew to the 
above early exemplars. Like the orders in Lone Pine, Love Canal, and Eggar, 
Lone Pine orders are typically issued only in cases involving multiple 
plaintiffs and complex problems of proof.48 And the orders typically compel 
plaintiffs to offer evidence similar to what Judges Wichmann, Doyle, and 
Battin demanded. Namely, under a prototypical Lone Pine order, each 
plaintiff must adduce prima facie evidence: (1) that she was exposed to the 
defendant’s product or contaminant and the circumstances surrounding this 
exposure, (2) that she has suffered, or is suffering, a bona fide impairment, 
and (3) proof of specific causation—which is to say, either an expert 
affidavit or expert report expressly connecting (1) with (2)—all by a court-
imposed deadline.49 In the event that a plaintiff fails to meet the court-
imposed cutoff or fails to satisfy the order’s requirements, the plaintiff ’s 
suit may be dismissed with prejudice.50 
C. Purpose
In terms of their purpose, Lone Pine orders are, it is commonly said, 
“designed to handle the complex issues and potential burdens on defendants 
and the court in mass tort litigation.”51 In others’ words, they “bring[] order 
to chaos”52 and offer a “simpler, more expeditious means” of organizing, and 
possibly resolving, complex civil litigation.53 Lone Pine orders offer this 
assistance by acting as a “procedural sieve.”54 Like a kitchen colander, they 
47 See, e.g., Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 886-87 (Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting 
petitioners’ argument that, in issuing what was, essentially, a Lone Pine order, the trial court 
“exceeded the scope of its inherent and discretionary powers”), modified (Mar. 20, 1992). But see 
Antero Res. Corp. v. Strudley, 347 P.3d 149, 153 (Colo. 2015) (“Colorado’s Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not allow a trial court to issue . . . a Lone Pine order[] that requires a plaintiff to present prima 
facie evidence in support of a claim before a plaintiff can exercise its full rights of discovery under 
the Colorado Rules.”). 
48 There are exceptions, however. See, e.g., Meyer v. Creative Nail Design, Inc., 975 P.2d 1264, 
1268 (Mont. 1999) (entering a Lone Pine order in a products liability suit involving just two 
plaintiffs); Schelske v. Creative Nail Design, Inc., 933 P.2d 799, 800 (Mont. 1997) (concerning the 
entry of a Lone Pine order in a case with two plaintiffs). 
49 Engstrom, supra note 12, at 20. 
50 Id. 
51 Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). 
52 Michelle Yeary, Lone Pine by Any Other Name, DRUG & DEVICE L., (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/02/lone-pine-by-any-other-name.html 
[https://perma.cc/N6ZP-ZVKX]. 
53 Gallagher v. FibreBoard Corp., 641 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
54 Steiner, supra note 12, at 86; accord Burnett, supra note 12, at 74 (“Lone Pine orders can . . . 
be used to weed out claims that judges may consider to be frivolous or unsupported by fact.”). 
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seek to isolate and wash away noncolorable claims, while preserving the 
claims of plaintiffs who can satisfy the order’s requirements and, in so 
doing, make out a prima facie case.55 
Beyond those bromides, there’s an uncomfortable fact about mass tort 
litigation that makes Lone Pine orders—and their capacity to wash away 
noncolorable claims—particularly attractive. That fact is that, for a slew of 
reasons, certain mass tort suits are susceptible to being contaminated by, or 
even overrun with, the inclusion of plaintiffs who do not have a legitimate 
claim for relief. Mass tort litigation has a regrettable track record of 
attracting some cases that are, as plaintiffs’ lawyer Paul Rheingold puts it, 
“junk.”56 Targeting that concern, Lone Pine orders are specially engineered 
to “shake the junk cases from the mass tort tree.”57 
II. PROS AND CONS OF THE LONE PINE MECHANISM
This Part sketches the normative landscape. The pro side of the Lone Pine 
ledger is, in large measure, implicit from the discussion above. Certain mass 
tort litigation is prone to being overrun by dubious claims. And in this unique, 
and uniquely charged environment, Lone Pine orders may act as a critical 
counterweight. By putting plaintiffs to an early test and purging those who 
don’t make the grade (or, as in Lone Pine, terminating the entire case, if all 
plaintiffs’ submissions fall short), Lone Pine orders may help courts to zero in 
on, and address, gaps in the plaintiffs’ evidence. This early scrutiny can, in 
turn, promote a number of worthy objectives. It can save defendants time, 
money, and aggravation, oftentimes sparing defendants from having to 
55 See Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 05-227, 2007 WL 315346, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2007) 
(“The basic purpose of a Lone Pine order is to identify and cull potentially meritless claims . . . .”). 
56 Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
941, 961 (1995) (quoting plaintiffs’ lawyer Paul D. Rheingold); see also Francis E. McGovern, 
Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 688 (1989) (“[M]ature mass torts generate 
an overabundance of plaintiffs . . . including a substantial number of false positive claims.”). For 
more evidence of this reality and a discussion of why, exactly, certain mass torts might become 
overrun with nonmeritorious claims, see Engstrom, supra note 12, at 22-33; Nora Freeman Engstrom, 
Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent Claiming, 115 MICH. L. REV. 639, 660-66 (2017). 
57 JOHN H. BEISNER & JESSICA D. MILLER, LITIGATE THE TORTS, NOT THE MASS: A 
MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING HOW MASS TORTS ARE ADJUDICATED 23 (2009), 
https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/beisner09.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRS3- 
RKFM]. Or, in another’s equally colorful description: “They help clean house; shake off free-riders 
hoping to hang in until a settlement.” Yeary, supra note 52; accord ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 149 (2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
D35M-VYLW] (observing that courts issue Lone Pine orders in response to an “abiding concern” 
that many MDL claimants “don’t really have claims”). 
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engage in costly, intrusive, and burdensome civil discovery.58 It can conserve 
scarce judicial resources and streamline and expedite the resolution of 
litigation.59 By extinguishing baseless claims, scrutiny can preserve the 
integrity of trial processes.60 And Lone Pine orders can even benefit 
“deserving” plaintiffs, who might otherwise have to share court time, counsel 
table, or even scarce settlement funds with those with dubious entitlements.61 
But just as Lone Pine orders are, in many quarters, lauded, they have also 
been subject to criticism. Many judges, in fact, have—particularly in recent 
years—voiced concerns about the “untethered use of the Lone Pine 
process.”62 Critics raise five main objections. 
First, some worry about cost. Lone Pine orders generally require 
plaintiffs to prepare individualized expert reports, and experts—
particularly scientific experts—are expensive. Thus, to enter a Lone Pine 
order is to impose a heavy (and lopsided) financial burden on plaintiffs.63 
Second, critics worry that Lone Pine orders are “inconsistently 
applied.”64 The record of this inconsistency is plain: In our review, we found 
that some courts stressed that the orders ought to be rarely issued and 
reserved for “exceptional” circumstances,65 while other courts, by contrast, 
seemed to issue Lone Pine orders almost as a matter of course.66 
Compounding the inconsistency, when Lone Pine orders are issued, they 
58 See, e.g., Miller v. Metrohealth Med. Ctr., No. 13-1465, 2014 WL 12589121, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 
Mar. 31, 2014) (entering a Lone Pine order to “prevent needless expense and time consuming 
discovery . . . where the plaintiff has not offered any substantive information as to the basis for his 
or her claim”); Michelle M. Bufano, Food for Thought: The Importance of the Early Disposition of Baseless 
Claims in New Jersey Products Liability Mass Tort Litigation, N.J. LAW., Aug. 2011, at 36, 37 (suggesting 
that Lone Pine orders relieve defendants from having to “spend time and money defending claims 
that have no merit”). 
59 See David B. Weinstein & Christopher Torres, An Art of War Lesson Applied to Mass Torts: The Lone 
Pine Strategy, ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n), Mar. 2011, at 
19, 20, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/eecc/201103_eecc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DT6E-AZDT] (“Lone Pine orders can also . . . achiev[e] judicial economy by avoiding 
unnecessary discovery, expert work, Daubert challenges, or other evidentiary proceedings.”). 
60 See Bufano, supra note 58, at 36 (suggesting that Lone Pine orders “curtail and discourage 
baseless claims”). 
61 See id. at 37 (“[L]egitimate plaintiffs also benefit from Lone Pine orders. For those plaintiffs 
that truly have a colorable cause of action supported by basic proofs, unsupported claims filed by 
other plaintiffs in the mass tort are detrimental. Frivolous claims divert everyone’s resources—
including those of plaintiffs’ counsel—and clog up the litigation.”). 
62 In re Digitek Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 249, 257 (S.D. W. Va. 2010). 
63 Engstrom, supra note 12, at 36. 
64 See, e.g., Simeone v. Girard City Bd. of Educ., 872 N.E.2d 344, 350 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) 
(“[M]any Lone Pine orders are inconsistently applied, which further confuses their purpose.”). 
65 See, e.g., Hostetler v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 15-0226, 2017 WL 359852, at *4, *6 (N.D. 
Ind. Jan. 25, 2017) (calling the entry of a Lone Pine order a “dramatic imposition” that “should be 
issued only in exceptional cases”). 
66 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 (E.D. La. 2008) (referring 
to the orders as “routinely used by courts to manage mass tort cases”). 
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differ along myriad dimensions, including in regard to the precise evidence 
they demand and the penalties they trigger in the event of noncompliance.67 
This variability raises normative concerns, as it means that Lone Pine orders’ 
utilization impairs horizontal equity and injects a degree of uncertainty, 
inconsistency, and unpredictability into court proceedings.68 Like litigants 
are supposed to be treated alike by the court system. Contemporary 
application of Lone Pine orders threatens that principle. 
Third, in many cases, Lone Pine orders demand what amounts to an 
impossible and unrealistic level of certainty. The orders, very often, ask 
plaintiffs to supply a yes-or-no, black-or-white answer to a question 
regarding specific causation: Did X contaminant actually cause plaintiff ’s Y 
injury? But this question calls for an answer that is, in many cases, invariably 
and inescapably grey.69 
Fourth, there is a deep and legitimate worry that Lone Pine orders are 
sometimes used as pseudo-summary judgment motions.70 As we explain in 
greater detail below, some Lone Pine orders function like summary judgment 
motions but simultaneously deprive plaintiffs of fundamental protections 
that Rule 56 generally affords.71 As such, to quote the Ohio Court of 
Appeals, the orders can “give[] courts the means to ignore existing 
procedural rules and safeguards.”72 
Fifth and finally, as we also discuss in more detail below, there is a worry 
that other Lone Pine orders—and, in particular, those orders issued in 
67 Engstrom, supra note 12, at 37-42 (discussing the uncomfortable variability among individual 
Lone Pine orders in regard to whether an order should be issued; if so, at what point the order should 
issue; and what, exactly, the order should say). 
68 Cf. Burnett, supra note 12, at 76 (“With no real guidelines to control the parameters and 
scope of Lone Pine orders, they are fertile grounds for inconsistency, personal prejudice, and ultra 
vires activity.” (footnote omitted)). 
69 See, e.g., Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 902 (Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J., 
dissenting) (chastising the majority for affirming the case’s dismissal pursuant to a Lone Pine-style 
order, while noting that “what the trial court sought was an impossibility in this as in virtually all toxic 
tort cases—evidence a given toxic or combination of toxics was the cause in fact of a given disease or 
other condition in a specific individual”), modified (Mar. 20, 1992); Engstrom, supra note 12, at 46-
52 (criticizing Lone Pine orders for “engraft[ing] a binary filter onto a question that is not susceptible 
to a yes-or-no answer”). 
70  Cottle, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 897 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (explaining that a case’s termination 
pursuant to a Lone Pine process may have “the purpose and effect of summary judgment but avoid[] 
the very procedures and protections the Legislature deemed essential”); Antero Res. Corp. v. 
Strudley, 347 P.3d 149, 159 (Colo. 2015) (“[I]f a Lone Pine order cuts off or severely limits the litigant’s 
right to discovery, the order closely resembles summary judgment, albeit without the safeguards 
supplied by the Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
71 These safeguards include access to discovery and the right to de novo appellate review. See 
infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
72 Simeone v. Girard City Bd. of Educ., 872 N.E.2d 344, 350 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
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MDLs at the twilight of litigation—might unduly strongarm claimants to 
accede to settlements they might rather refuse.73 
III. OFFERING MORE DETAIL: OUR DATASET
In order to say more about Lone Pine orders—including when they are 
commonly issued and what their effect might be—we built a dataset of 
ninety-seven Lone Pine orders.74 We assembled the dataset, comprised of 
both published and unpublished orders, from Westlaw searches, by 
conducting a comprehensive literature review, and by corresponding with—
and obtaining information from—dozens of attorneys involved in 
potentially relevant litigation.75 
We begin with a few notes regarding our methodology. First, because 
Lone Pine orders are themselves so variable, we struggled with the 
determination of whether a particular case management order fairly 
qualified as a Lone Pine order for purposes of inclusion within our dataset. 
We ultimately included in our dataset any case management order that 
either (1) required a plaintiff to provide prima facie evidence of exposure, 
injury, and causation under threat of some penalty, often dismissal,76 or (2) 
73 See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
74 We have posted many of the orders included in our dataset online at Lone Pine Orders, 
STAN. L. SCH., https://lonepineorders.law.stanford.edu [https://perma.cc/XVR4-YJGW] (last 
updated Jan. 6, 2020). 
75 We particularly benefited from, and are grateful to, ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, 
MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2019); Ruskin, 
supra note 12; Michele Yeary, Lone Pine Cheat Sheet, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Nov. 30, 2012), 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2012/11/lone-pine-cheat-shee.html 
[https://perma.cc/W45U-6CZH]. Despite the hundreds of hours we have spent crafting our 
dataset from publicly and nonpublicly available sources, the dataset almost certainly fails to 
capture all Lone Pine orders issued since 1986. Furthermore, the subset of orders we have captured 
may be unrepresentative; “visible” orders might differ from invisible orders in important—but 
impossible-to-discern—ways. Because of these limitations, we do not suggest that our dataset is 
a representative sample of all Lone Pine orders issued nationally; as a consequence, the 
generalizability of our findings remains uncertain. 
76 Thus, we include orders meeting these criteria that may have arisen independently of Lore 
v. Lone Pine, such as the order discussed in Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Ct. App.
1992), and its progeny. At the outer limits of orders included in our dataset are orders requiring a
narrower showing, where one or more of the elements of exposure, causation, and injury were not
contested. However, we excluded various orders that failed to compel plaintiffs to make a prima
facie showing. E.g., Order to Show Cause, In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-0135
(D.N.J. July 22, 2010). Nor did we include within our dataset orders requiring the submission of
plaintiff fact sheets. Usually answered under oath, plaintiff fact sheets typically require each plaintiff
swept into an aggregate action to submit basic information about her background, her injury, any
past claims she has lodged seeking compensation, and the identity of her diagnosing physician.
Engstrom, supra note 12, at 20. Unlike Lone Pine orders, then, plaintiff fact sheets do not require a
prima facie showing of causation. Id. at 21. For more on plaintiff fact sheets, see generally MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.83 (2004); MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED.
 
2020] Lone Pine Orders 103 
was referred to as a “Lone Pine order” by the trial or appellate court.77 As 
noted, these efforts yielded a dataset of ninety-seven orders. After 
compiling these orders and associated explanatory information, we hand-
coded relevant data, including the following: 
1. The type of suit (e.g., product liability, environmental
contamination, or other);
2. The date the Lone Pine order was issued;
3. Whether the order required a showing of specific causation;
4. Whether the order required a plaintiff to submit an expert report
or affidavit and, if so, whether the court required a report or
affidavit sufficient to survive a Daubert challenge;
5. When in the course of the litigation the order was issued, and, in
particular, whether the Lone Pine order was issued (i) prior to
discovery, (ii) during discovery, or (iii) in the “twilight” phase of
litigation, which is to say, toward the end of litigation, when a
settlement had been forged and the key question was whether each
individual claimant would opt into that settlement; and
6. The observed effect or effects of the order. When available from
the record or correspondance with attorneys involved in the
litigation, we also recorded the number of plaintiffs affected by
each order.
Our review yielded five key findings concerning Lone Pine orders’ 
incidence, when in the course of litigation Lone Pine orders are issued, the 
content of the orders, and the orders’ observed effects. 
JUDICIAL CTR., PLAINTIFF FACT SHEETS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY PROCEEDINGS 2008–2018 (2019), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/49/ 
PFS%20in%20MDL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YVX-AVDT]; Engstrom, supra note 12, at 19-22. A final 
note is that we excluded from our dataset cases where the defendant’s motion for a Lone Pine order was 
granted, but for one reason or another, the order never issued. E.g., In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Plant Fire 
Litig., No. 94-MS-3-C-1, 2005 WL 6252291, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 29, 2005) (granting the defendant’s 
motion for a Lone Pine order but declining to issue the order until the defendant identified those 
plaintiffs who would be subject to it); cf. In re 1994 Chem. Plant Fire, No. 94-MS-3-C-1, 2005 WL 
6252290, at *1 (M.D. La. July 15, 2005) (declining to certify for interlocutory appeal the trial court’s 
grant of defendant’s motion for a Lone Pine order because “the order has not yet been entered”). 
77 In this circumstance, we included case management orders that do not clearly fit our formal 
definition of a Lone Pine order. E.g., In re Jobe Concrete Prods., Inc., No. 08-01-00351-CV, 2001 WL 
1555656, at *2-3, *5 (Tex. App. Dec. 6, 2001) (referring to the trial court’s order for plaintiffs to 
“designate a group of 12 Plaintiffs” to be subject to a special inquiry as a “Lone Pine order”). 
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A. Case Type
First, we found that the vast majority of Lone Pine orders were issued in 
mass tort litigation. In our dataset, 58% of Lone Pine orders were issued in 
lawsuits alleging environmental contamination or non-product toxic 
exposure, and 41% were issued in product liability lawsuits. 
Figure 1: Lone Pine Orders by Case Type 
B. Frequency
Second, it appears that, from 1986 through 2014, Lone Pine orders were 
issued with increasing frequency. Further, from 2015 through 2019, it appears 
possible that the orders’ popularity has flagged. But as Figure 2 indicates, the 
data is noisy, and given the limitations of our dataset, any conclusion 
regarding relative incidence ought to be viewed with caution.78 
78 As of the time of writing (August 2019), we cannot be sure how many Lone Pine orders will 
issue during the latter half of 2019. Further, when looking for trends, it bears noting that recently 
filed Lone Pine orders are particularly likely to be missed by our data-collection procedures. That’s 
so because some unpublished orders only became Westlaw “visible” due to subsequent commentary 
or subsequent litigation of the same case. More broadly, when assessing incidence, two additional 
caveats are in order. First, as noted above, because our sample is almost certainly incomplete, see 
supra note 75, any finding regarding incidence ought to be viewed with caution. It could conceivably 
be that Lone Pine orders’ issuance has stayed relatively constant over the past thirty years, but that, 
over time, the orders have simply become more and then less “visible” to researchers. Second, in the 
vast majority of cases (ninety-one out of ninety-seven), we were able to identify the precise year of 
each order’s issuance. In a small minority of cases, however, we could only place the issuance of a 
Lone Pine order within a range of dates. For those six orders, Figure 2 represents our best estimation 
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Figure 2: Annual Entry of Lone Pine Orders 
C. Content of Lone Pine Orders
Third, when it comes to what precisely Lone Pine orders say, 
approximately three-quarters of the orders in our dataset required at least 
some plaintiffs to offer expert testimony (typically, an expert affidavit or 
report) regarding specific causation (i.e., that product or contaminant X 
actually caused injury or ailment Y).79 
Digging deeper, most Lone Pine orders mandated attestation of specific 
causation to “a reasonable degree” of scientific certainty.80 Taking this tack, 
for example, in the Fosamax MDL, plaintiffs were required to offer a sworn 
expert report attesting “[w]hether the expert believes to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty that Fosamax caused Plaintiff ’s alleged injury, and if so, 
the factual and medical/scientific bases for that opinion.”81 
Beyond that, some orders were satisfied by expert attestation that the 
defendant’s product or contaminant “substantially contributed to the personal 
79 Admittedly, this finding is in some ways circular, given our definitional screen described above. 
80 See, e.g., Order, In re AET Inc. Ltd., No. 10-0051, 2018 WL 4203351, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 
13, 2018) (requiring the submission of “an [expert] opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical 
or scientific probability, that any injury, illness, or condition suffered by the claimant was caused 
by the exposure to petroleum and/or petroleum-based products spilled from the Eagle Otome, or 
caused by the collision”). 
81 Order, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-1789, 2014 WL 12748902, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 






















106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 168: 91 
injury alleged by Plaintiff.”82 Demanding more, others sought a showing of 
specific causation without qualification.83 A small minority went so far as to 
require the expert to rule out other possible causes of the plaintiff ’s injury.84 
Interestingly, too, some Lone Pine orders that required an expert report 
further specified that the expert’s testimony must be sufficiently reliable to 
survive a Daubert challenge.85 Zeroing in, the vast majority of Lone Pine 
orders in our dataset did not address whether or not the plaintiff ’s expert 
needed to pass muster under Daubert. Of the twelve orders that did address 
this critical question, four explicitly disavowed the requirement. Judge Eldon 
Fallon ruled in the Vioxx MDL, for example: “[T]he Court is not requiring 
that Plaintiffs provide expert reports sufficient to survive a Daubert challenge 
or even provide an expert who will testify at trial.”86 Ratcheting up scrutiny, 
eight of the twelve orders required the plaintiffs’ evidence to be sufficient to 
survive a Daubert challenge.87 
82 E.g., Order Regarding Preservation of Records and Prima Facie Evidence of Usage, Injury 
and Causation Requirements for Pending Cases Not Participating in the Nuvaring Resolution 
Program and Newly Filed or Transferred Cases at 4, In re Nuvaring Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-1964 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014). 
83 E.g., Pretrial Order No. 8 at 3, In re Tex. State Vioxx Litig., No. 2005-59499 (Harris Cty. 
Dist. Ct. Nov. 9, 2007) (requiring expert attestation “that the Plaintiff suffered an injury and . . . 
that Vioxx caused the injury”). 
84 Simeone v. Girard City Bd. of Educ., 872 N.E.2d 344, 351 (Ohio App. Ct. 2007) (discussing 
the trial court’s prediscovery order, which compelled plaintiffs to “provide sworn statements from 
experts that to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the [plaintiffs’] illnesses, injuries, and 
conditions could not have been caused but for that exposure”); Ruskin, supra note 12, at 609 
(reporting a Lone Pine order as requiring an “affidavit of a physician or other expert, which shall 
include . . . [a] differential diagnosis which establishes that the physician or expert has formed an 
opinion that, more probably than not, the plaintiffs’ illness did not have some etiology” other than 
exposure to defendant’s contaminant (quoting Order, Wilson v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., No. CJ-
1996-564 (Tulsa Cty. Dist. Ct. 1997))). 
85 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court established that 
district court judges ought to be “gatekeep[ers]” to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and 
reliable. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Essentially codifying Daubert and its progeny, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 now establishes that expert testimony is admissible if and only if  
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
86 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744 (E.D. La. 2008), aff ’d, 388 F. 
App’x. 391 (5th Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., Abner v. Hercules, Inc., No. 14-0063, 2017 WL 4236584, 
at *9 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2017) (“The Court did not require Plaintiffs to provide expert reports 
sufficient to survive a Daubert challenge or even provide an expert who will testify at trial.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
87 E.g., Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Tr., 633 F.3d 828, 833-34, 836-40 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(affirming a dismissal, where the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims because their Lone Pine 
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D. Timing: Prior to Discovery, During Discovery, or
During the Twilight Phase of Litigation 
Fourth, we examined when in the course of litigation Lone Pine orders 
are issued. We found great variation along this dimension. 
We were able to pinpoint when in the litigation’s lifecycle eighty of the 
ninety-seven Lone Pine orders in our dataset were entered. (For the remaining 
seventeen orders, timing was unclear.) Of those eighty orders, thirty (37.5%) 
were issued prior to discovery, thirty (37.5%) were issued during discovery, 
and twenty (25%) were issued during the twilight stage of litigation. 
Generally, these twilight orders were issued in the MDL context, after the 
lead plaintiffs’ attorneys had hammered out a tentative settlement agreement 
and were, often in concert with the defendant, trying to corral the remaining 
plaintiffs to opt in.88 
In some ways, the relative frequency of both prediscovery Lone Pine 
orders and twilight orders is, and ought to be, unsurprising. As to the 
former, as noted above, numerous courts and commentators define Lone Pine 
orders as “prediscovery” orders.89 The orders’ frequent issuance prior to 
discovery, then, is hardly revelatory. As to the latter, other courts and 
commentators have, similarly, come to conceive of—and describe—Lone 
Pine orders as “mop up procedure[s]”90 or orders sought “after the settlement 
is consummated.”91 Yet, we find Lone Pine orders’ incidence on both sides 
of the litigation continuum noteworthy as, in our view, both prediscovery 
and twilight orders raise significant—and, heretofore underappreciated—
normative concerns. 
submissions were “wanting under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert”); Order on PSO’s 
Motion for Scheduling Order at 5, Wilson, No. CJ-1996-564 (Tulsa Cty. Dist. Ct. Apr. 8, 1997) 
(“[T]he court finds the Daubert test to be the appropriate test which will govern scientific evidence 
proffered in this matter.”). 
88 See Order, supra note 81, at *1 (reporting that Lone Pine orders “are frequently granted after 
the parties have agreed to a mass settlement program”); BURCH, supra note 75, at 33 (explaining that, 
in the Yasmin/Yaz MDL, the Lone Pine order was used to “fortif[y] attorneys’ efforts to herd 
plaintiffs” into the global settlement); Burch, supra note 15, at 99-100 (explaining that, in the Vioxx 
MDL, Merck’s motion for a twilight Lone Pine order was “unopposed” and likely helped lead to the 
settlement’s high participation rate); Brian Amaral, Judge Wants More Info From Fresenius Dialysis 
Patients, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2016, 6:19 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/872889/judge-wants-
more-info-from-fresenius-dialysis-patients [https://perma.cc/8PNC-SV6H] (quoting defense 
counsel as stating that Judge Woodlock issued a Lone Pine order at the tail end of the Fresenius 
litigation, in part, in order to “encourage some plaintiffs to settle”). 
89 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
90 E.g., Order, supra note 81, at *1 (recounting the Fosamax Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s 
argument that “Lone Pine is appropriately used as a ‘post-settlement mop-up procedure utilized to 
address those cases which either were not eligible for compensation through the MDL settlement 
program or which had opted out of participation in the MDL settlement program’”). 
91  E.g., Rave, supra note 15, at 2186 (defining Lone Pine orders as orders sought “after the 
settlement is consummated”). 
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1. Prediscovery Orders
As noted above, prediscovery Lone Pine orders—which, again, comprised 
37.5% of the orders in our sample—arguably permit the trial court to make an 
end-run around Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (or state-court 
counterparts), while depriving plaintiffs of certain procedural protections 
that Rule 56 (or state-court counterparts) would otherwise afford. The 
problem arises because the rules are clear that summary judgment is not 
appropriate unless and until the party opposing the motion for summary 
judgment is afforded an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.92 
Prediscovery Lone Pine orders function an awful lot like orders issued 
pursuant to Rule 56. But plaintiffs’ prejudgment discovery rights, jealously 
guarded by Rule 56, are, in the Lone Pine context, infringed or nullified. 
Add to that, a court’s decision to grant summary judgment for a defendant 
pursuant to Rule 56 is reviewed de novo.93 But a court’s decision to terminate 
a case for noncompliance with a Lone Pine order is often reviewed pursuant 
to the far more lenient abuse of discretion standard.94 That means that, by 
opting to extinguish a case via Lone Pine rather than Rule 56, a trial court 
can go a long way toward insulating its termination decision from 
meaningful appellate review. 
Beyond the potential for procedural funny business, we fear that the 
significant expense of complying with Lone Pine orders and the difficulty of 
acquiring evidence of specific causation without access to discovery mean that 
the orders are apt to precipitate the premature and unwarranted dismissal of 
at least some meritorious claims. 
92 See, e.g., Moore v. Shelby Cty., Ky., 718 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that “the 
district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment for Defendants before permitting 
the parties any discovery” because “[c]ommon sense dictates that before a district court tests a 
party’s evidence, the party should have the opportunity to develop and discover the evidence”); 
Hellstrom v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 201 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[S]ummary judgment 
should only be granted if after discovery, the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing 
on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof.” (alterations 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
93 See, e.g., Brooks v. Roy, 776 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that a grant of summary 
judgment is reviewed de novo). 
94 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A district 
court’s adoption of a Lone Pine order and decision to dismiss a case for failing to comply with a Lone 
Pine order are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 
(5th Cir. 2000) (reviewing for abuse of discretion); Atwood v. Warner Elec. Brake & Clutch Co., 
605 N.E.2d 1032, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same); Simeone v. Girard City Bd. of Educ., 872 N.E.2d 
344, 348 (Ohio App. Ct. 2007) (same). 
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2. Twilight Orders
Twilight orders—issued during the sunset of litigation, which comprise 
nearly a quarter of our sample—raise a different but equally troubling set of 
normative and ethical concerns. Twilight orders are often issued by transferee 
courts in MDL proceedings once a comprehensive settlement has been forged 
and individual plaintiffs are assessing whether or not to opt in to that 
settlement. As such, they affect those plaintiffs who are weighing whether to, 
on the one hand, accede to the negotiated deal, or, on the other, reject it, in 
favor of further litigation back in the transferor court. The problem is that, 
given the demands they impose and the circumstances surrounding their 
imposition, Lone Pine orders can put a heavy—and, in some instances, too 
heavy—thumb on the scale in favor of the former, unduly deterring plaintiffs 
from insisting on their day in court.95 
The concern arises due to the combined influence of three stubborn facts. 
The first fact is that, as noted above, compliance with Lone Pine orders is 
expensive. Approximately three-quarters of the orders in our dataset required 
each plaintiff to hire an expert to attest to specific causation (among other 
things). Orders also frequently demanded that the plaintiff satisfy additional 
burdensome requirements, such as gathering years of pharmacy receipts and 
medical records.96 Fact two is that, in many cases, plaintiffs must satisfy these 
onerous requirements on a short fuse: case-specific expert reports can be due 
in as few as thirty days.97 The third and final fact is that twilight orders are 
sometimes issued alongside global settlement agreements that contain (1) 
attorney-recommendation provisions, wherein, as part of the settlement, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers promise to “recommend that their clients enter the 
settlement program,” (2) attorney withdrawal provisions, wherein, as part of 
95 The “thumb” may, in fact, become coercive, in arguable contravention of the Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, which advises: “A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their 
lawyers to settle matters in dispute but shall not act in a manner that coerces any party into 
settlement.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.6(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer shall abide by 
a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”). For further discussion of how twilight Lone Pine 
orders can coax plaintiffs to relinquish their claims, see Burch, supra note 15, at 68-78; Jeremy T. 
Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 155 (2012); 
Rave, supra note 15, at 2185. 
96 BURCH, supra note 75, at 33. 
97 See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 236 at 3, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 07-1871 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (imposing a thirty to sixty-day deadline depending on 
plaintiff ’s status plus a fourteen-day cure period); Case Management Order No. 78, at 5-6 In re 
Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-2385, (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2014) (imposing 
a thirty-day deadline with a twenty-day cure period); Pretrial Order No. 4F at 3, In re Chantix 
(Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2039 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2013) (imposing a thirty-day 
deadline with no cure period); N.Y. Rezulin Pretrial Order, supra note 5, at 3 (imposing a sixty-day 
deadline with no cure period). 
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the settlement, plaintiffs’ lawyers pledge to withdraw from representing 
nonsettling plaintiffs, and also (3) nonsolicitation provisions, wherein, as part 
of the settlement, the lawyer agrees not to recruit or accept any new client.98 
Putting those three facts together means that some plaintiffs who wish to 
refuse a settlement offer will face a Lone Pine order that demands detailed and 
expensive proof, at the very moment they’ve lost their old lawyer and cannot 
find new qualified counsel. In such a situation, a claimant who prefers not to 
release her claims is put in an awkward and arguably impossible position: she 
may reluctantly acquiesce to the settlement or, alternatively, reject it, which 
means she has limited time to scramble to try to comply with a Lone Pine 
order with no lawyer to assist her in locating a qualified scientific expert or 
compiling requisite proof.99 
E. Observed Effects
Last but not least, we examined the effect or effects that each Lone Pine 
order appeared to have upon the litigation. This investigation proved 
challenging. The difficulty arose because, although the effects of Lone Pine 
orders were crystal clear in some cases (e.g., Lone Pine order X triggered the 
entire case’s termination or Lone Pine order Y had no discernable effect), in 
many other cases, an order could have a range of effects, impacting different 
plaintiffs differently. For example, in a given case, Plaintiff A might be able 
to muster enough proof to comply with the Lone Pine order rendering the 
order’s entry little more than a pricey speedbump, while Plaintiff B’s 
submission might fall short, triggering B’s dismissal. 
98 These “closure mechanisms,” made famous in the Vioxx litigation, are ethically dubious but 
according to Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, quite common. BURCH, supra note 75, at 44-45; Burch, 
supra note 12, at 73-74 (describing the use of “clauses that require plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend 
that all of their clients settle and to withdraw from representing clients who refuse” and further 
noting that “these mandatory recommendation and withdrawal provisions tend to appear alongside 
simultaneous agreements for attorneys not to solicit or accept new clients”); Burch, supra note 15, at 
99-101 (describing the recommendation and attorney-withdrawal mechanisms in the Fosamax, Vioxx,
Propulsid, and Pelvic Mesh settlement agreements).
99 See BURCH, supra note 75, at 118 (explaining that, after the settlement is inked, “both sides 
use Lone Pine orders to send a pointed message to nonsettling plaintiffs: accept the deal or prepare 
for what may be a short-fused evidentiary burden”); see also Burch, supra note 12, at 74 (describing 
how plaintiffs may be forced to proceed pro se if they opt out of a settlement agreement which 
contains a mandatory withdrawal clause); Grabill, supra note 89, at 154-55 (noting that the 
additional burdens on nonsettling plaintiffs “deter additional litigation and maximize the degree 
of closure that defendants obtain through settlement”). For a fuller discussion of these normative 
and ethical considerations, see generally Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent 
Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011) (defining certain mass tort settlements as “lawyer-
empower[ing],” as opposed to litigant-empowering, using Vioxx as a case study); Owen M. Fiss, 
Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1076 (1984) (discussing the asymmetric balance of 
power in settlement situations). 
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Further, the orders may also have invisible or contested effects. Thus, we 
strongly suspect that twilight Lone Pine orders have caused some plaintiffs 
to accede to settlements that they (1) would have preferred to refuse and (2) 
actually would have refused, in the orders’ absence. But proving that 
Plaintiff C’s decision to settle was driven by the twilight order, Plaintiff D’s 
decision was gently influenced by the twilight order, while Plaintiff E’s 
decision was made independently of that twilight order is not possible, at 
least with the data we have. 
With those caveats, however, we can make a few tentative claims 
regarding Lone Pine orders’ observed effects. We were able to observe 
whether the Lone Pine order had an effect in eighty of the orders in our 
dataset. Of these eighty (“effect-coded”) orders, forty-five orders (56%) 
precipitated the dismissal of at least some claims, and twenty orders (25%) 
precipitated summary judgment for at least some defendants on at least some 
claims. Once we eliminated double-counting, we observed that 74% of the 
eighty effect-coded orders (or 61% of all orders in our dataset) resulted in 
the dismissal of some plaintiffs’ claims or the grant for defendants of at least 
partial summary judgment.100 In only 19% of the eighty effect-coded orders 
(or, 16% of all cases in our dataset) does it appear that the court found that 
plaintiffs had substantially complied with the order. 
Then, when we examined the “when” question, addressed above in 
Section E, alongside the effect question, we found that the likelihood that a 
Lone Pine order would result in the dismissal of some plaintiffs’ claims varied 
with the stage in litigation when the Lone Pine order was issued. As noted 
above, the most common observed consequence of a Lone Pine order’s entry 
was the dismissal of at least some plaintiffs’ claims. However, the observed 
dismissal rate of the eighty effect-coded orders was higher when a Lone Pine 
order was issued during the prediscovery (57%) and twilight (77%) phases than 
when the order was entered in the midst of discovery (43%).101 Meanwhile, the 
observed rate of settlement was significantly higher when a Lone Pine order 
was issued in the twilight phase of litigation (35%). Settlements were, it 
appears, less frequent when the order was issued before or during discovery 
(which yielded observed settlement rates of 7% and 4%, respectively). 
100 This figure counts an order resulting in both dismissal and summary judgment once, 
meaning it avoids the double-counting that would arise were one to add the observed dismissal rate 
with the observed summary judgment rate. All our calculations of dismissals exclude one case that 
was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction for reasons unrelated to the Lone Pine order’s entry. 
101 We calculated these figures by, first, identifying each order for which we observed some 
effect and categorizing these “effect-coded” orders by the stage of litigation during which they 
issued. Then, we divided the number of orders in each “stage-category” that precipitated the 
dismissal of some claims by the total number of effect-coded orders in the same stage-category. We 
were able to determine the effect of twenty-eight of the thirty prediscovery and discovery orders 
and seventeen of the twenty orders issued during the twilight phase. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since their inception, Lone Pine orders have become, by some accounts, 
“routine.”102 Yet we have found that case management orders imposed under 
the auspices of Lore v. Lone Pine admit of considerable variation in their terms 
and conditions of their issuance. Lone Pine orders are also very powerful: 74% 
of the effect-coded orders (or 61% of all orders in our study) were followed by 
a grant of at least partial summary judgment for defendants or by the dismissal 
of at least some of the plaintiffs’ claims. Given the power they hold, and the 
few rules that constrain (or even govern) their use, we recommend that courts 
proceed cautiously and consider carefully the equity of imposing Lone Pine 
orders, especially in the prediscovery and twilight phases of litigation.103 
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